Part
I: Philosophy
CHAPTER VI
THE
THEORY OF THE SUPREME STATE
IN dealing with the subject of Values in its human aspect, many
points of practical importance arise. One of these can probably
best be seen in correct perspective, by an examination of
common human motives. It is involved in the complaint against
the modern cooperative industrial system, that its routine
operations are soul killing, monotonous, and without interest,
and that a remedy can be found, and can only be found in a return
to handicraft.
A
good deal of the criticism which has proceeded from "Intellectuals,"
concerned, and rightly concerned, with the desperate defects
of contemporary society, has been directed to stress this point.
It is an aspect of modern industrialism which lends itself to
picturesque treatment and sentimentalism, and probably the exploitation
of it offers more emotional reward to the would-be reformer,
and obtains wider acquiescence from his public, than is the
case with the more mechanical aspects of the same problem.
While
it may be necessary, for these and other reasons, to suspect
over-emphasis, there are solid grounds for the complaint, and
it is well worth examination.
In
so doing, we may employ a conception which will be familiar
to students of Eastern Philosophy, which regards the world,
or society, as a macrocosm or "Great Man," reflecting on a gigantic
scale the microcosm or individual man. In this conception every
attribute of the human individual is repeated on a mighty scale
in the "World Man," and, to this World Man, the "Prince of this
World," the human individual bears very much the same relation
that the blood corpuscle of the individual does to the human
body. It is no part of the purpose of this book to offer any
opinion as to the extent to which this conception has any basis
in absolute truth, but it is undeniable that it does form a
convenient basis in estimating the probable success of any suggested
set of human relationships.
Now
the interest of the blood corpuscle, if it can be imagined to
have an interest, is only concerned with the body of which it
is a constituent in so far as the continued existence of that
body tends towards its own progressive evolution, and the interest
of the human individual in society is similar. Any other conception,
besides being pharisaical and sentimental, is an invitation
to all those influences which stand ready to exploit the individual
under cover of such phrases as Public Interest and National
Duty. But it is equally true, so far as we can see, that the
expansion of the human unit is dependent upon the progress of
society. That is to say, upon environment. Virtue may
flourish in the gutter, but if Virtue can only flourish
in the gutter, as some people would have us believe, then it
is time that the nature of Virtue received severe scrutiny.
If these relationships be admitted, at any rate for the purpose
of a working hypothesis, it seems to follow that the human individual
has two aspects, one of which is functional, and specialised,
and is only concerned with the health and well-being of the
"Great Man," i.e. Society, of which he forms a part.
Out of this aspect, he benefits indirectly, not directly. This
is exactly the position of the individual in regard to the division
of labour which forms the basis of co-operative industrialism.
To proceed with our chosen analogy, the individual can, in the
nature of things, only form a constituent of one function of
the Great Man, at any one instant of time. There is nothing
to prevent his forming a constituent of another function at
a subsequent period of time. There seems to be nothing inherently
absurd in a man being a brick-layer in the morning, and a Company
Director in the afternoon, and, in fact, there are good grounds
for imagining that something of this sort may come to pass.
But the point it is desired to stress at the present moment,
is that, in this aspect, the individual is not serving his individuality,
but ought to be serving his environment in the best way possible,
and direct artistic gratification from work performed in this
way is neither specifically to be looked for, nor is it the
immediate object of the work. It may even be the cause of a
narrow outlook.
Whether
society as a whole can be imagined to have an individuality
of its own or not, it may be repeated that Society's individuality
is not a prime interest of the human individual. It is an auxiliary
interest, and may even be a perversive interest. It is most
probably true that there can be no divergence between true Public
Interest and any true private interest; if it were so, words
would have lost their meaning; but it is certain that no crushing
of individuality by Society can ever conduce to the well-being
of other individuals. The human individual, under the same conception,
contains either in a latent or active form, every function and
attribute, although on a minute scale, which can be imagined
to reside in a world society. Consequently, although work for
its own sake, or employment as an end and not a means, is objectionable
when it is purely functional, or to put the matter in everyday
terms, since it is plainly desirable to cut down the amount
of time necessary to improve the general environment at whatever
rate is deemed desirable, work for its own sake may quite easily
be essential to the well-being of the individual. The difference
is subtle, but it is vital. To knit a jumper or to dig and plough
because of the satisfaction of knitting a jumper or of creating
a garden or a wheatfield, or even because it is healthy, is
one thing, and it may happen as a by-product that the jumper
or the wheatfield will be superlatively well done; to knit jumpers,
or to dig and plough ten hours a day, six days a week, fifty-two
weeks a year, because unless this is done the mere necessities
of existence cannot be obtained, is quite another. To dress
neatly, comfortably, and suitably, taking half an hour over
the process, seems reasonable; to spend the day in dressing
is monomania - our forbears called it "possession." When we
do things under the compulsion of Society, we are blood-corpuscles,
not individuals; we are doing them in the interests of Society
primarily, and only secondarily, if at all, in the interests
of our own individuality. As society is at present constituted,
it is quite definitely to its advantage, and tends to the perpetuation
of the present form of Society, that Lancashire mill operatives
should work the maximum number of hours at a very dull occupation,
with the minimum of change of work, and if individuals had no
interests as such, that is to say, if they were Robots, contemporary
society would probably work very well, and no difficulties would
arise. But Lancashire mill operatives are developing individualities,
and their interests are clearly not the same as those of Society
as at present constructed. In one way or another the various
units which compose the Society are proclaiming unmistakably
their objection to a purely passive role, and the conflict which
we see proceeding all over the world at the present time will
clearly determine whether Society has power to remould the individual
so that he becomes purely a passive agent in respect of purposes
which he cannot understand, and has no means of estimating,
or, on the other hand, whether the individual by non-co-operation
or otherwise, can break up or remould Society. For my own part
I have small doubt as to the outcome.