Part
I: Philosophy
CHAPTER III
THE RELATION OF THE GROUP TO THE INDIVIDUAL
WE
live so close to a world shot through with the theory of rewards
and punishments that the relation between the system and its
results is apt to escape us. We are told for instance, with
all the emphasis which can be given to the assertion by the
prestige of names much in the public eye, that our present distress
arises because we are a poor nation as the result of a great
war. The idea inherent in this is that war is wicked, poverty
is painful, and wicked people who went to war ought to endure
pain, and, therefore, we ought to be poor. And because of this
logical morality the idea is accepted almost unquestioningly
by millions of people who only have to use their eyes to see
the patent absurdity of it. Is there a manufacturer in this
country, or for that matter in any other, who is not clamouring
to turn out more goods if someone will give him orders for them?
Is there a farmer who is complaining that his land and his stock
are unable to cope with the demands for agricultural produce
which pour in upon him? If so, an explanation as to why nearly
three million acres of arable land have gone back to pasture
in the last twelve years, would be interesting.
On
the other hand, it is patent that, in spite of this enormous
actual and potential reservoir of the goods for which mankind
has a use, a large proportion of the population is unable to
get at them. What is it, then, which stands in between this
enormous reservoir of supply and the increasing clamour of the
multitudes, able to voice, but unable to satisfy their demand?
The answer is so short as to be almost banal. It is Money. And
as we shall see, the position into which money and the methods
by which it is controlled and manipulated have brought the world,
arises, not from any defect or vice inseparable from money
(which is probably one of the most marvellous and perfect agencies
for enabling co-operation, that the world has ever conceived),
but because of the subordination of this powerful tool to the
objective of what it is not unfair to call a hidden government.
Now
it is impossible to conceive (in spite of a good deal of cynicism
to the contrary) of a government which has not a policy, although
that policy may be far from apparent. The conception of government
postulates that certain lines of action and conduct shall be
inhibited, and that the persons governed shall be allowed to
proceed only in some predetermined direction. In other words,
government is limitation, and from the nature of the limitations
it is possible to determine the policy of the organisation imposing
the limitations. For instance, while it is true enough to say
that extensive military preparations do not necessarily mean
war, the qualification implied in this statement is that the
main threat which such preparations constitute will be sufficient
to achieve the desired result without the actual use of military
force. The military preparations impose a limit on action in
certain directions, and then become indications, and often valuable
indications, of the policy of nations.
Similarly,
if we consider dispassionately the situation to which reference
has just been made (a world which is either actually or potentially
overflowing with material riches, and, at the same time, a population
which is prevented from obtaining them by a set of rules supported
by every possible device that legal organisation can devise),
we can say that we are in the presence of an effective and
active government, irrespective of the source of that government;
and that government must have a policy. For our immediate purpose,
it is nearly irrelevant whether that policy is a conscious policy,
in the sense of having been put into a clear and logical form
by some body of men, however small, or whether it is unconscious
in the sense that it is the outcome of something we call human
nature. The important matter is to get a clear conception of
what the policy is as a first step to supporting or opposing
it, if it is agreed that we have any measure of self-government,
or ought to have any.
One
of the first facts to be observed as part of the social ideal
which leans for its sanctions on rewards and punishments, is
the elevation of the group ideal and the minimising of individuality,
i.e. the treatment of individuality as subordinate to, e.g.
nationality. The manifestations of this idea are almost endless.
We have the national idea, the class or international idea,
the identification of the individual with the race, the school,
the regiment, the profession, and so forth. There is probably
no more subtle and elusive subject than the consideration of
the exact relation of the group in all these and countless other
forms, to the individuals who compose the groups. But as far
as it is possible to sum the matter up, the general problem
seems to be involved in a decision as to whether the individual
should be sacrificed to the group or whether the fruits of group
activity should be always at the disposal of the individual.
If we consider this problem in connection with the industrial
and economic situation, it is quite incontestable that every
condition tending to subordinate the individual to the group
is, at the moment, fostered. Institutions which would appear
to have nothing in common and to be, in fact, violently opposed,
can be seen on closer investigation to have this idea in common,
and to that extent to have no fundamental antagonism. Pre-war
Germany was always exhibited as being reactionary, feudal, and
militaristic to an extent unequalled by any other great power.
Post-war Russia is supposed by large masses of discontented
workers, to be the antithesis of all this. But the similarity
of the two is daily becoming more apparent and it is notorious
that the leaders of pre-war Germany are flocking to post-war
Russia in increasing numbers, in the lively hope of the fulfilment
of the ideals which were frustrated by the Great War. The latest
pronouncements on industrial affairs by Russian statesmen are
indistinguishable from those of American, German, or British
bankers (which statement is not intended as undiluted praise).
It is significant that the arguments voiced from all of these
quarters are invariably appeals to mob psychology - "Europe
must be saved "Workers of the World unite, etc. The appeal is
away from the conscious-reasoning individual, to the unconscious
herd instinct. And the "interests" to be saved, require mobs,
not individuals.
No
consideration of this subject would be complete without recognising
the bearing upon it of what is known as the Jewish Question;
a question rendered doubly difficult by the conspiracy of silence
which surrounds it. At the moment it can only be pointed out
that the theory of rewards and punishments is Mosaic in origin;
that finance and law derive their main inspiration from the
same source, and that countries such as prewar Germany and postwar
Russia, which exhibit the logical consequences of unchecked
collectivism, have done so under the direct influence of Jewish
leaders. Of the Jews themselves, it may be said that they exhibit
the race-consciousness idea to an extent unapproached elsewhere,
and it is fair to say that their success in many walks of life
is primarily due to their adaptation to an environment which
has been moulded in conformity with their own ideal. That is
as far as it seems useful to go, and there may be a great deal
to be said on the other side. It has not yet, I think, been
said in such a way as to dispose of the suggestion, which need
not necessarily be an offensive suggestion, that the Jews are
the protagonists of collectivism in all its forms, whether it
is camouflaged under the name of Socialism, Fabianism, or "big
business," and that the opponents of collectivism must look
to the Jews for an answer to the indictment of the theory itself.
It should in any case be emphasised that it is the Jews as a
group, and not as individuals, who are on trial, and that the
remedy, if one is required, is to break up the group activity.
The
shifting of emphasis from the individual to the group, which
is involved in collectivism, logically involves a shifting of
responsibility for action. This can be made, it would appear,
an interesting test of the validity of the theory. For instance,
the individual killing of one man by another we term murder.
But collective and wholesale killing, we dignify by the name
of war, and we specifically absolve the individual from the
consequences of any acts which are committed under the orders
of a superior officer. This appears to work admirably so long
as the results of the action do not take place on a plane on
which they can be observed; but immediately they do, the theory
obviously breaks down. There may be, ex-hypothesi, no
moral guilt attributable to the individual who goes to war;
but the effect of intercepting the line of flight of a high-speed
bullet will be found to be exactly the same whether it is fired
by a national or a private opponent. Nations are alleged to
have waged the first world war, but the casualties both of life
and property fell upon individuals. There is no such thing as
an effective national responsibility - it is a pure abstraction,
under cover of which, oppression and tyranny to individuals,
which would not be tolerated if inflicted by a personal ruler,
escape effective criticism.
We
do not know what is the automatic reaction consequent on the
killing of one individual by another, as distinct from the non-automatic
and artificial reaction involved in the trial and punishment
of a murderer in a court of law. But we do know that over every
plane of action with which we are acquainted, action and reaction
are equal, opposite, and wholly automatic. Consequently, there
is nothing to indicate that the automatic consequences of a
given action will exhibit any difference if committed under
the orders of a superior officer, or not. Further, it may be
observed that non-automatic "punishment" really constitutes
a separate group of actions and reactions.
If
we throw a stone into a still pool of water, the ripples which
result are not eliminated by throwing in a second stone, although
they may be masked, and to the extent that legal punishments
represent, not the ripples from the first stone, but the casting
of the second, it will be seen that a complicated situation
is inevitable.
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