
Book
Two:
OF
THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.
CHAPTER II
Of Money considered as a particular
Branch of the general
Stock of the
Society, or of the Expense of
maintaining
the National Capital
It has been shown in the first book, that the price of the greater
part of commodities resolves itself into three parts, of which
one pays the wages of the labour, another the profits of the
stock, and a third the rent of the land which had been employed
in producing and bringing them to market: that there are, indeed,
some commodities of which the price is made up of two of those
parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock: and
a very few in which it consists altogether in one, the wages
of labour: but that the price of every commodity necessarily
resolves itself into some one, or other, or all of these three
parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to wages,
being necessarily profit to somebody.
Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard
to every particular commodity, taken separately, it must be
so with regard to all the commodities which compose the whole
annual produce of the land and labour of every country, taken
complexly. The whole price or exchangeable value of that annual
produce must resolve itself into the same three parts, and
be parcelled out among the different inhabitants of the country,
either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock,
or the rent of their land.
But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land
and labour of every country is thus divided among and constitutes
a revenue to its different inhabitants, yet as in the rent
of a private estate we distinguish between the gross rent and
the net rent, so may we likewise in the revenue of all the
inhabitants of a great country.
The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever is
paid by the farmer; the net rent, what remains free to the
landlord, after deducting the expense of management, of repairs,
and all other necessary charges; or what, without hurting his
estate, he can afford to place in his stock reserved for immediate
consumption, or to spend upon his table, equipage, the ornaments
of his house and furniture, his private enjoyments and amusements.
His real wealth is in proportion, not to his gross, but to
his net rent.
The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country
comprehends the whole annual produce of their land and labour;
the net revenue, what remains free to them after deducting
the expense of maintaining- first, their fixed, and, secondly,
their circulating capital; or what, without encroaching upon
their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate
consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies,
and amusements. Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not
to their gross, but to their net revenue.
The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital must evidently
be excluded from the net revenue of the society. Neither the
materials necessary for supporting their useful machines and
instruments of trade, their profitable buildings, etc., nor
the produce of the labour necessary for fashioning those materials
into the proper form, can ever make any part of it. The price
of that labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen
so employed may place the whole value of their wages in their
stock reserved for immediate consumption. But in other sorts
of labour, both the price and the produce go to this stock,
the price to that of the workmen, the produce to that of other
people, whose subsistence, conveniences, and amusements, are
augmented by the labour of those workmen.
The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the productive
powers of labour, or to enable the same number of labourers
to perform a much greater quantity of work. In a farm where
all the necessary buildings, fences, drains, communications,
etc., are in the most perfect good order, the same number of
labourers and labouring cattle will raise a much greater produce
than in one of equal extent and equally good ground, but not
furnished with equal conveniencies. In manufactures the same
number of hands, assisted with the best machinery, will work
up a much greater quantity of goods than with more imperfect
instruments of trade. The expense which is properly laid out
upon a fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid with great
profit, and increases the annual produce by a much greater
value than that of the support which such improvements require.
This support, however, still requires a certain portion of
that produce. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour
of a certain number of workmen, both of which might have been
immediately employed to augment the food, clothing and lodging,
the subsistence and conveniencies of the society, are thus
diverted to another employment, highly advantageous indeed,
but still different from this one. It is upon this account
that all such improvements in mechanics, as enable the same
number of workmen to perform an equal quantity of work, with
cheaper and simpler machinery than had been usual before, are
always regarded as advantageous to every society. A certain
quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of
workmen, which had before been employed in supporting a more
complex and expensive machinery, can afterwards be applied
to augment the quantity of work which that or any other machinery
is useful only for performing. The undertaker of some great
manufactory who employs a thousand a year in the maintenance
of his machinery, if he can reduce this expense to five hundred
will naturally employ the other five hundred in purchasing
an additional quantity of materials to be wrought up by an
additional number of workmen. The quantity of that work, therefore,
which his machinery was useful only for performing, will naturally
be augmented, and with it all the advantage and conveniency
which the society can derive from that work.
The expense of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country
may very properly be compared to that of repairs in a private
estate. The expense of repairs may frequently be necessary
for supporting the produce of the estate, and consequently
both the gross and the net rent of the landlord. When by a
more proper direction, however, it can be diminished without
occasioning any diminution of produce, the gross rent remains
at least the same as before, and the net rent is necessarily
augmented.
But though the whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital
is thus necessarily excluded from the net revenue of the society,
it is not the same case with that of maintaining the circulating
capital. Of the four parts of which this latter capital is
composed- money, provisions, materials, and finished work-
the three last, it has already been observed, are regularly
withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of
the society, or in their stock reserved for immediate consumption.
Whatever portion of those consumable goods is employed in maintaining
the former, goes all to the latter, and makes a part of the
net revenue of the society. The maintenance of those three
parts of the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no portion
of the annual produce from the net revenue of the society,
besides what is necessary for maintaining the fixed capital.
The circulating capital of a society is in this respect different
from that of an individual. That of an individual is totally
excluded from making any part of his net revenue, which must
consist altogether in his profits. But though the circulating
capital of every individual makes a part of that of the society
to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded
from making a part likewise of their net revenue. Though the
whole goods in a merchant's shop must by no means be placed
in his own stock reserved for immediate consumption, they may
in that of other people, who, from a revenue derived from other
funds, may regularly replace their value to him, together with
its profits, without occasioning any diminution either of his
capital or of theirs.
Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital
of a society, of which the maintenance can occasion any diminution
in their net revenue.
The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital
which consists in money, so far as they affect the revenue
of the society, bear a very great resemblance to one another.
First, as those machines and instruments of trade, etc., require
a certain expense, first to erect them, and afterwards to support
them, both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross,
are deductions from the net revenue of the society; so the
stock of money which circulates in any country must require
a certain expense, first to collect it, and afterwards to support
it, both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross,
are, in the same manner, deductions from the net revenue of
the society. A certain quantity of very valuable materials,
gold and silver, and of very curious labour, instead of augmenting
the stock reserved for immediate consumption, the subsistence,
conveniencies, and amusements of individuals, is employed in
supporting that great but expensive instrument of commerce,
by means of which every individual in the society has his subsistence,
conveniencies, and amusements regularly distributed to him
in their proper proportions.
Secondly, as the machines and instruments of a trade, etc.,
which compose the fixed capital either of an individual or
of a society, make no part either of the gross or of the net
revenue of either; so money, by means of which the whole revenue
of the society is regularly distributed among all its different
members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel
of circulation is altogether different from the goods which
are circulated by means of it. The revenue of the society consists
altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel which circulates
them. In computing either the gross or the net revenue of any
society, we must always, from their whole annual circulation
of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of
which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either.
It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition
appear either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained
and understood, it is almost self-evident.
When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes
mean nothing but the metal pieces of which it is composed;
and sometimes we include in our meaning some obscure reference
to the goods which can be had in exchange for it, or to the
power of purchasing which the possession of it conveys. Thus
when we say that the circulating money of England has been
computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to express the
amount of the metal pieces, which some writers have computed,
or rather have supposed to circulate in that country. But when
we say that a man is worth fifty or a hundred pounds a year,
we mean commonly to express not only the amount of the metal
pieces which are annually paid to him, but the value of the
goods which he can annually purchase or consume. We mean commonly
to ascertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the
quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of
life in which he can with propriety indulge himself.
When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to
express the amount of the metal pieces of which it is composed,
but to include in its signification some obscure reference
to the goods which can be had in exchange for them, the wealth
or revenue which it in this case denotes, is equal only to
one of the two values which are thus intimated somewhat ambiguously
by the same word, and to the latter more properly than to the
former, to the money's worth more properly than to the money.
Thus if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person,
he can in the course of the week purchase with it a certain
quantity of subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. In
proportion as this quantity is great or small, so are his real
riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is certainly
not equal both to the guinea, and to what can be purchased
with it, but only to one or other of those two equal values;
and to the latter more properly than to the former, to the
guinea's worth rather than to the guinea.
If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold,
but in a weekly bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would
not so properly consist in the piece of paper, as in what he
could get for it. A guinea may be considered as a bill for
a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies upon all
the tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person
to whom it is paid, does not so properly consist in the piece
of gold, as in what he can get for it, or in what he can exchange
it for. If it could be exchanged for nothing, it would, like
a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than the most useless
piece of paper.
Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants
of any country, in the same manner, may be, and in reality
frequently is paid to them in money, their real riches, however,
the real weekly or yearly revenue of all of them taken together,
must always be great or small in proportion to the quantity
of consumable goods which they can all of them purchase with
this money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together
is evidently not equal to both the money and the consumable
goods; but only to one or other of those two values, and to
the latter more properly than to the former.
Though we frequently, therefore, express a person's revenue
by the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, it is because
the amount of those pieces regulates the extent of his power
of purchasing, or the value of the goods which he can annually
afford to consume. We still consider his revenue as consisting
in this power of purchasing or consuming, and not in the pieces
which convey it.
But if this is sufficiently evident even with regard to an
individual, it is still more so with regard to a society. The
amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to an individual,
is often precisely equal to his revenue, and is upon that account
the shortest and best expression of its value. But the amount
of the metal pieces which circulate in a society can never
be equal to the revenue of all its members. As the same guinea
which pays the weekly pension of one man to-day, may pay that
of another to-morrow, and that of a third the day thereafter,
the amount of the metal pieces which annually circulate in
any country must always be of much less value than the whole
money pensions annually paid with them. But the power of purchasing,
or the goods which can successively be bought with the whole
of those money pensions as they are successively paid, must
always be precisely of the same value with those pensions;
as must likewise be the revenue of the different persons to
whom they are paid. That revenue, therefore, cannot consist
in those metal pieces, of which the amount is so much inferior
to its value, but in the power of purchasing, in the goods
which can successively be bought with them as they circulate
from hand to hand.
Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great
instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade,
though it makes a part and a very valuable part of the capital,
makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs;
and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the
course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man
the revenue which properly belongs to him, they make themselves
no part of that revenue.
Thirdly, and lastly, the machines and instruments of trade,
etc., which compose the fixed capital, bear this further resemblance
to that part of the circulating capital which consists in money;
that as every saving in the expense of erecting and supporting
those machines, which does not diminish the productive powers
of labour, is an improvement of the net revenue of the society,
so every saving in the expense of collecting and supporting
that part of the circulating capital which consists in money,
is an improvement of exactly the same kind.
It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly, too, been explained
already, in what manner every saving in the expense of supporting
the fixed capital is an improvement of the net revenue of the
society. The whole capital of the undertaker of every work
is necessarily divided between his fixed and his circulating
capital. While his whole capital remains the same, the smaller
the one part, the greater must necessarily be the other. It
is the circulating capital which furnishes the materials and
wages of labour, and puts industry into motion. Every saving,
therefore, in the expense of maintaining the fixed capital,
which does not diminish the productive powers of labour, must
increase the fund which puts industry into motion, and consequently
the annual produce of land and labour, the real revenue of
every society.
The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money,
replaces a very expensive instrument of commerce with one much
less costly, and sometimes equally convenient. Circulation
comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which it costs less
both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But in what
manner this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends
to increase either the gross or the net revenue of the society,
is not altogether so obvious, and may therefore require some
further explication.
There are several different sorts of paper money; but the
circulating notes of banks and bankers are the species which
is best known, and which seems best adapted for this purpose.
When the people of any particular country have such confidence
in the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker,
as to believe that he is always ready to pay upon demand such
of his promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented
to him; those notes come to have the same currency as gold
and silver money, from the confidence that such money can at
any time be had for them.
A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory
notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand
pounds. As those notes serve all the purposes of money, his
debtors pay him the same interest as if he had lent them so
much money. This interest is the source of his gain. Though
some of those notes are continually coming back upon him for
payment, part of them continue to circulate for months and
years together. Though he has generally in circulation, therefore,
notes to the extent of a hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand
pounds in gold and silver may frequently be a sufficient provision
for answering occasional demands. By this operation, therefore,
twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform all the functions
which a hundred thousand could otherwise have performed. The
same exchanges may be made, the same quantity of consumable
goods may be circulated and distributed to their proper consumers,
by means of his promissory notes, to the value of a hundred
thousand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and silver money.
Eighty thousand pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can,
in this manner, be spared from the circulation of the country;
and if different operations of the same kind should, at the
same time, be carried on by many different banks and bankers,
the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part
only of the gold and silver which would otherwise have been
requisite.
Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating money
of some particular country amounted, at a particular time,
to one million sterling, that sum being then sufficient for
circulating the whole annual produce of their land and labour.
Let us suppose, too, that some time thereafter, different banks
and bankers issued promissory notes, payable to the bearer,
to the extent of one million, reserving in their different
coffers two hundred thousand pounds for answering occasional
demands. There would remain, therefore, in circulation, eight
hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver, and a million of
bank notes, or eighteen hundred thousand pounds of paper and
money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour
of the country had before required only one million to circulate
and distribute it to its proper consumers, and that annual
produce cannot be immediately augmented by those operations
of banking. One million, therefore, will be sufficient to circulate
it after them. The goods to be bought and sold being precisely
the same as before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient
for buying and selling them. The channel of circulation, if
I may be allowed such an expression, will remain precisely
the same as before. One million we have supposed sufficient
to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is poured into it
beyond this sum cannot run in it, but must overflow. One million
eight hundred thousand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred
thousand pounds, therefore, must overflow, that sum being over
and above what can be employed in the circulation of the country.
But though this sum cannot be employed at home, it is too valuable
to be allowed to lie idle. It will, therefore, be sent abroad,
in order to seek that profitable employment which it cannot
find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a
distance from the banks which issue it, and from the country
in which payment of it can be exacted by law, it will not be
received in common payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to
the amount of eight hundred thousand pounds will be sent abroad,
and the channel of home circulation will remain filled with
a million of paper, instead of the million of those metals
which filled it before.
But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus
sent abroad, we must not imagine that it is sent abroad for
nothing, or that its proprietors make a present of it to foreign
nations. They will exchange it for foreign goods of some kind
or another, in order to supply the consumption either of some
other foreign country or of their own.
If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign country
in order to supply the consumption of another, or in what is
called the carrying trade, whatever profit they make will be
an addition to the net revenue of their own country. It is
like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade; domestic
business being now transacted by paper, and the gold and silver
being converted into a fund for this new trade.
If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption,
they may either, first, purchase such goods as are likely to
be consumed by idle people who produce nothing, such as foreign
wines, foreign silks, etc.; or, secondly, they may purchase
an additional stock of materials, tools, and provisions, in
order to maintain and employ an additional number of industrious
people, who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual
consumption.
So far as it is employed in the first way, it promotes prodigality,
increases expense and consumption without increasing production,
or establishing any permanent fund for supporting that expense,
and is in every respect hurtful to the society.
So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes industry;
and though it increases the consumption of the society, it
provides a permanent fund for supporting that consumption,
the people who consume reproducing, with a profit, the whole
value of their annual consumption. The gross revenue of the
society, the annual produce of their land and labour, is increased
by the whole value which the labour of those workmen adds to
the materials upon which they are employed; and their net revenue
by what remains of this value, after deducting what is necessary
for supporting the tools and instruments of their trade.
That the greater part of the gold and silver which, being
forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in
purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, is and must
be employed in purchasing those of this second kind, seems
not only probable but almost unavoidable. Though some particular
men may sometimes increase their expense very considerably
though their revenue does not increase at all, we may be assured
that no class or order of men ever does so; because, though
the principles of common prudence do not always govern the
conduct of every individual, they always influence that of
the majority of every class or order. But the revenue of idle
people, considered as a class or order, cannot, in the smallest
degree, be increased by those operations of banking. Their
expense in general, therefore, cannot be much increased by
them, though that of a few individuals among them may, and
in reality sometimes is. The demand of idle people, therefore,
for foreign goods being the same, or very nearly the same,
as before, a very small part of the money, which being forced
abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing
foreign goods for home consumption, is likely to be employed
in purchasing those for their use. The greater part of it will
naturally be destined for the employment of industry, and not
for the maintenance of idleness.
When we compute the quantity of industry which the circulating
capital of any society can employ, we must always have regard
to those parts of it only which consist in provisions, materials,
and finished work: the other, which consists in money, and
which serves only to circulate those three, must always be
deducted. In order to put industry into motion, three things
are requisite; materials to work upon, tools to work with,
and the wages or recompense for the sake of which the work
is done. Money is neither a material to work upon, nor a tool
to work with; and though the wages of the workman are commonly
paid to him in money, his real revenue, like that of all other
men, consists, not in money, but in the money's worth; not
in the metal pieces, but in what can be got for them.
The quantity of industry which any capital can employ must,
evidently, be equal to the number of workmen whom it can supply
with materials, tools, and a maintenance suitable to the nature
of the work. Money may be requisite for purchasing the materials
and tools of the work, as well as the maintenance of the workmen.
But the quantity of industry which the whole capital can employ
is certainly not equal both to the money which purchases, and
to the materials, tools, and maintenance, which are purchased
with it; but only to one or other of those two values, and
to the latter more properly than to the former.
When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver money,
the quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance, which
the whole circulating capital can supply, may be increased
by the whole value of gold and silver which used to be employed
in purchasing them. The whole value of the great wheel of circulation
and distribution is added to the goods which are circulated
and distributed by means of it. The operation, in some measure,
resembles that of the undertaker of some great work, who, in
consequence of some improvement in mechanics, takes down his
old machinery, and adds the difference between its price and
that of the new to his circulating capital, to the fund from
which he furnishes materials and wages to his workmen.
What is the proportion which the circulating money of any
country bears to the whole value of the annual produce circulated
by means of it, it is, perhaps, impossible to determine. It
has been computed by different authors at a fifth, at a tenth,
at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth part of that value. But
how small soever the proportion which the circulating money
may bear to the whole value of the annual produce, as but a
part, and frequently but a small part, of that produce, is
ever destined for the maintenance of industry, it must always
bear a very considerable proportion to that part. When, therefore,
by the substitution of paper, the gold and silver necessary
for circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth part of the
former quantity, if the value of only the greater part of the
other four-fifths be added to the funds which are destined
for the maintenance of industry, it must make a very considerable
addition to the quantity of that industry, and, consequently,
to the value of the annual produce of land and labour.
An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty
or thirty years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection
of new banking companies in almost every considerable town,
and even in some country villages. The effects of it have been
precisely those above described. The business of the country
is almost entirely carried on by means of the paper of those
different banking companies, with which purchases and payments
of kinds are commonly made. Silver very seldom appears except
in the change of a twenty shillings bank note, and gold still
seldomer. But though the conduct of all those different companies
has not been unexceptionable, and has accordingly required
an act of Parliament to regulate it, the country, notwithstanding,
has evidently derived great benefit from their trade. I have
heard it asserted, that the trade of the city of Glasgow doubled
in about fifteen years after the first erection of the banks
there; and that the trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled
since the first erection of the two public banks at Edinburgh,
of which the one, called the Bank of Scotland, was established
by act of Parliament in 1695; the other, called the Royal Bank,
by royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade, either of Scotland
in general, or the city of Glasgow in particular, has really
increased in so great a proportion, during so short a period,
I do not pretend to know. If either of them has increased in
this proportion, it seems to be an effect too great to be accounted
for by the sole operation of this cause. That the trade and
industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably
during this period, and that the banks have contributed a good
deal to this increase, cannot be doubted.
The value of the silver money which circulated in Scotland
before the union, in 1707, and which, immediately after it,
was brought into the Bank of Scotland in order to be recoined,
amounted to L411,117 10s. 9d. sterling. No account has been
got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient accounts
of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually
coined somewhat exceeded that of the silver. There were a good
many people, too, upon this occasion, who, from a diffidence
of repayment, did not bring their silver into the Bank of Scotland:
and there was, besides, some English coin which was not called
in. The whole value of the gold and silver, therefore, which
circulated in Scotland before the union, cannot be estimated
at less than a million sterling. It seems to have constituted
almost the whole circulation of that country; for though the
circulation of the Bank of Scotland, which had then no rival,
was considerable, it seems to have made but a very small part
of the whole. In the present times the whole circulation of
Scotland cannot be estimated at less than two millions, of
which that part which consists in gold and silver most probably
does not amount to half a million. But though the circulating
gold and silver of Scotland have suffered so great a diminution
during this period, its real riches and prosperity do not appear
to have suffered any. Its agriculture, manufactures, and trade,
on the contrary, the annual produce of its land and labour,
have evidently been augmented.
It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by
advancing money upon them before they are due, that the greater
part of banks and bankers issue their promissory notes. They
deduct always, upon whatever sum they advance, the legal interest
till the bill shall become due. The payment of the bill, when
it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what had
been advanced, together with a clear profit of the interest.
The banker who advances to the merchant whose bill he discounts,
not gold and silver, but his own promissory notes, has the
advantage of being able to discount to a greater amount, by
the whole value of his promissory notes, which he finds by
experience are commonly in circulation. He is thereby enabled
to make his clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum.
The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very great,
was still more inconsiderable when the two first banking companies
were established, and those companies would have had but little
trade had they confined their business to the discounting of
bills of exchange. They invented, therefore, another method
of issuing their promissory notes; by granting what they called
cash accounts, that is by giving credit to the extent of a
certain sum (two or three thousand pounds, for example) to
any individual who could procure two persons of undoubted credit
and good landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever
money should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the
credit had been given, should be repaid upon demand, together
with the legal interest. Credits of this kind are, I believe,
commonly granted by banks and bankers in all different parts
of the world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch banking
companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar
to them, and have, perhaps, been the principal cause, both
of the great trade of those companies and of the benefit which
the country has received from it.
Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those companies,
and borrows a thousand pounds upon it, for example, may repay
this sum piecemeal, by twenty and thirty pounds at a time,
the company discounting a proportionable part of the interest
of the great sum from the day on which each of those small
sums is paid in till the whole be in this manner repaid. All
merchants, therefore, and almost all men of business, find
it convenient to keep such cash accounts with them, and are
thereby interested to promote the trade of those companies,
by readily receiving their notes in all payments, and by encouraging
all those with whom they have any influence to do the same.
The banks, when their customers apply to them for money, generally
advance it to them in their own promissory notes. These the
merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers
to the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to
their landlords for rent, the landlords repay them to the merchants
for the conveniencies and luxuries with which they supply them,
and the merchants again return them to the banks in order to
balance their cash accounts, or to replace what they may have
borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole money business
of the country is transacted by means of them. Hence the great
trade of those companies.
By means of those cash accounts every merchant can, without
imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwise could
do. If there are two merchants, one in London and the other
in Edinburgh, who employ equal stocks in the same branch of
trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without imprudence, carry
on a greater trade and give employment to a greater number
of people than the London merchant. The London merchant must
always keep by him a considerable sum of money, either in his
own coffers, or in those of his banker, who gives him no interest
for it, in order to answer the demands continually coming upon
him for payment of the goods which he purchases upon credit.
Let the ordinary amount of this sum be supposed five hundred
pounds. The value of the goods in his warehouse must always
be less by five hundred pounds than it would have been had
he not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed. Let us suppose
that he generally disposes of his whole stock upon hand, or
of goods to the value of his whole stock upon hand, once in
the year. By being obliged to keep so great a sum unemployed,
he must sell in a year five hundred pounds' worth less goods
than he might otherwise have done. His annual profits must
be less by all that he could have made by the sale of five
hundred pounds worth more goods; and the number of people employed
in preparing his goods for the market must be less by all those
that five hundred pounds more stock could have employed. The
merchant in Edinburgh, on the other hand, keeps no money unemployed
for answering such occasional demands. When they actually come
upon him, he satisfies them from his cash account with the
bank, and gradually replaces the sum borrowed with the money
or paper which comes in from the occasional sales of his goods.
With the same stock, therefore, he can, without imprudence,
have at all times in his warehouse a larger quantity of goods
than the London merchant; and can thereby both make a greater
profit himself, and give constant employment to a greater number
of industrious people who prepare those goods for the market.
Hence the great benefit which the country has derived from
this trade.
The facility of discounting bills of exchange it may be thought
indeed, gives the English merchants a conveniency equivalent
to the cash accounts of the Scotch merchants. But the Scotch
merchants, it must be remembered, can discount their bills
of exchange as easily as the English merchants; and have, besides,
the additional conveniency of their cash accounts.
The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate
in any country never can exceed the value of the gold and silver,
of which it supplies the place, or which (the commerce being
supposed the same) would circulate there, if there was no paper
money. If twenty shilling notes, for example, are the lowest
paper money current in Scotland, the whole of that currency
which can easily circulate there cannot exceed the sum of gold
and silver which would be necessary for transacting the annual
exchanges of twenty shillings value and upwards usually transacted
within that country. Should the circulating paper at any time
exceed that sum, as the excess could neither be sent abroad
nor be employed in the circulation of the country, it must
immediately return upon the banks to be exchanged for gold
and silver. Many people would immediately perceive that they
had more of this paper than was necessary for transacting their
business at home, and as they could not send it abroad, they
would immediately demand payment of it from the banks. When
this superfluous paper was converted into gold and silver,
they could easily find a use for it by sending it abroad; but
they could find none while it remained in the shape of paper.
There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks
to the whole extent of this superfluous paper, and, if they
showed any difficulty or backwardness in payment, to a much
greater extent; the alarm which this would occasion necessarily
increasing the run.
Over and above the expenses which are common to every branch
of trade; such as the expense of house-rent, the wages of servants,
clerks, accountants, etc.; the expenses peculiar to a bank
consist chiefly in two articles: first, in the expense of keeping
at all times in its coffers, for answering the occasional demands
of the holders of its notes, a large sum of money, of which
it loses the interest; and, secondly, in the expense of replenishing
those coffers as fast as they are emptied by answering such
occasional demands.
A banking company, which issues more paper than can be employed
in the circulation of the country, and of which the excess
is continually returning upon them for payment, ought to increase
the quantity of gold and silver, which they keep at all times
in their coffers, not only in proportion to this excessive
increase of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion;
their notes returning upon them much faster than in proportion
to the excess of their quantity. Such a company, therefore,
ought to increase the first article of their expense, not only
in proportion to this forced increase of their business, but
in a much greater proportion.
The coffers of such a company too, though they ought to be
filled much fuller, yet must empty themselves much faster than
if their business was confined within more reasonable bounds,
and must require, not only a more violent, but a more constant
and uninterrupted exertion of expense in order to replenish
them. The coin too, which is thus continually drawn in such
large quantities from their coffers, cannot be employed in
the circulation of the country. It comes in place of a paper
which is over and above what can be employed in that circulation,
and is therefore over and above what can be employed in it
too. But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it must,
in one shape or another, be sent abroad, in order to find that
profitable employment which it cannot find at home; and this
continual exportation of gold and silver, by enhancing the
difficulty, must necessarily enhance still further the expense
of the bank, in finding new gold and silver in order to replenish
those coffers, which empty themselves so very rapidly. Such
a company, therefore, must, in proportion to this forced increase
of their business, increase the second article of their expense
still more than the first.
Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which
the circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ,
amounts exactly to forty thousand pounds; and that for answering
occasional demands, this bank is obliged to keep at all times
in its coffers ten thousand pounds in gold and silver. Should
this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thousand pounds,
the four thousand pounds which are over and above what the
circulation can easily absorb and employ, will return upon
it almost as fast as they are issued. For answering occasional
demands, therefore, this bank ought to keep at all times in
its coffers, not eleven thousand pounds only, but fourteen
thousand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by the interest
of the four thousand pounds' excessive circulation; and it
will lose the whole expense of continually collecting four
thousand pounds in gold and silver, which will be continually
going out of its coffers as fast as they are brought into them.
Had every particular banking company always understood and
attended to its own particular interest, the circulation never
could have been overstocked with paper money. But every particular
banking company has not always understood or attended to its
own particular interest, and the circulation has frequently
been overstocked with paper money.
By issuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excess
was continually returning, in order to be exchanged for gold
and silver, the Bank of England was for many years together
obliged to coin gold to the extent of between eight hundred
thousand pounds and a million a year; or at an average, about
eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. For this great coinage
the bank (in consequence of the worn and degraded state into
which the gold coin had fallen a few years ago) was frequently
obliged to purchase gold bullion at the high price of four
pounds an ounce, which it soon after issued in coin at 53 17s.
10 1/2d. an ounce, losing in this manner between two and a
half and three per cent upon the coinage of so very large a
sum. Though the bank therefore paid no seignorage, though the
government was properly at the expense of the coinage, this
liberality of government did not prevent altogether the expense
of the bank.
The Scotch banks, in consequence of an excess of the same
kind, were all obliged to employ constantly agents at London
to collect money for them, at an expense which was seldom below
one and a half or two per cent. This money was sent down by
the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an additional expense
of three quarters per cent or fifteen shillings on the hundred
pounds. Those agents were not always able to replenish the
coffers of their employers so fast as they were emptied. In
this case the resource of the banks was to draw upon their
correspondents in London bills of exchange to the extent of
the sum which they wanted. When those correspondents afterwards
drew upon them for the payment of this sum, together with the
interest and a commission, sonic of those banks, from the distress
into which their excessive circulation had thrown them, had
sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught but by
drawing a second set of bills either upon the same, or upon
some other correspondents in London; and the same sum, or rather
bills for the same sum, would in this manner make sometimes
more than two or three journeys, the debtor, bank, paying always
the interest and commission upon the whole accumulated sum.
Even those Scotch banks which never distinguished themselves
by their extreme imprudence, were sometimes obliged to employ
this ruinous resource.
The gold coin which was paid out either by the Bank of England,
or by the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their
paper which was over and above what could be employed in the
circulation of the country, being likewise over and above what
could be employed in that circulation, was sometimes sent abroad
in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and sent abroad
in the shape of bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold
to the Bank of England at the high price of four pounds an
ounce. It was the newest, the heaviest, and the best pieces
only which were carefully picked out of the whole coin, and
either sent abroad or melted down. At home, and while they
remained in the shape of coin, those heavy pieces were of no
more value than the light. But they were of more value abroad,
or when melted down into bullion, at home. The Bank of England,
notwithstanding their great annual coinage, found to their
astonishment that there was every year the same scarcity of
coin as there had been the year before; and that notwithstanding
the great quantity of good and new coin which was every year
issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead of growing
better and better, became every year worse and worse. Every
year they found themselves under the necessity of coining nearly
the same quantity of gold as they had coined the year before,
and from the continual rise in the price of gold bullion, in
consequence of the continual wearing and clipping of the coin,
the expense of this great annual coinage became every year
greater and greater. The Bank of England, it is to be observed,
by supplying its own coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged
to supply the whole kingdom, into which coin is continually
flowing from those coffers in a great variety of ways. Whatever
coin therefore was wanted to support this excessive circulation
both of Scotch and English paper money, whatever vacuities
this excessive circulation occasioned in the necessary coin
of the kingdom, the Bank of England was obliged to supply them.
The Scotch banks, no doubt, paid all of them very dearly for
their own imprudence and inattention. But the Bank of England
paid very dearly, not only for its own imprudence, but for
the much greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch banks.
The overtrading of some bold projectors in both parts of the
United Kingdom was the original cause of this excessive circulation
of paper money.
What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker
of any kind, is not either the whole capital with which he
trades, or even any considerable part of that capital; but
that part of it only which he would otherwise be obliged to
keep by him unemployed, and in ready money for answering occasional
demands. If the paper money which the bank advances never exceeds
this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold and silver
which would necessarily circulate in the country if there was
no paper money; it can never exceed the quantity which the
circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ.
When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange
drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as
soon as it becomes due, is really paid by that debtor, it only
advances to him a part of the value which he would otherwise
be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money for
answering occasional demands. The payment of the bill, when
it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had
advanced, together with the interest. The coffers of the bank,
so far as its dealings are confined to such customers, resemble
a water pond, from which, though a stream is continually running
out, yet another is continually running in, fully equal to
that which runs out; so that, without any further care or attention,
the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little
or no expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers
of such a bank.
A merchant, without overtrading, may frequently have occasion
for a sum of ready money, even when he has no bills to discount.
When a bank, besides discounting his bills, advances him likewise
upon such occasions such sums upon his cash account, and accepts
of a piecemeal repayment as the money comes in from the occasional
sale of his goods, upon the easy terms of the banking companies
of Scotland; it dispenses him entirely from the necessity of
keeping any part of his stock by him unemployed and in ready
money for answering occasional demands. When such demands actually
come upon him, he can answer them sufficiently from his cash
account. The bank, however, in dealing with such customers,
ought to observe with great attention, whether in the course
of some short period (of four, five, six, or eight months for
example) the sum of the repayments which it commonly receives
from them is, or is not, fully equal to that of the advances
which it commonly makes to them. If, within the course of such
short periods, the sum of the repayments from certain customers
is, upon most occasions, fully equal to that of the advances,
it may safely continue to deal with such customers. Though
the stream which is in this case continually running out from
its coffers may be very large, that which is continually running
into them must be at least equally large; so that without any
further care or attention those coffers are likely to be always
equally or very near equally full; and scarce ever to require
any extraordinary expense to replenish them. If, on the contrary,
the sum of the repayments from certain other customers falls
commonly very much short of the advances which it makes to
them, it cannot with any safety continue to deal with such
customers, at least if they continue to deal with it in this
manner. The stream which is in this case continually running
out from its coffers is necessarily much larger than that which
is continually running in; so that, unless they are replenished
by some great and continual effort of expense, those coffers
must soon be exhausted altogether.
The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a
long time very careful to require frequent and regular repayments
from all their customers, and did not care to deal with any
person, whatever might be his fortune or credit, who did not
make, what they called, frequent and regular operations with
them. By this attention, besides saving almost entirely the
extraordinary expense of replenishing their coffers, they gained
two other very considerable advantages.
First, by this attention they were enabled to make some tolerable
judgment concerning the thriving or declining circumstances
of their debtors, without being obliged to look out for any
other evidence besides what their own books afforded them;
men being for the most part either regular or irregular in
their repayments, according as their circumstances are either
thriving or declining. A private man who lends out his money
to perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of debtors, may, either
by himself or his agents, observe and inquire both constantly
and carefully into the conduct and situation of each of them.
But a banking company, which lends money to perhaps five hundred
different people, and of which the attention is continually
occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no regular
information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the
greater part of its debtors beyond what its own books afford
it. In requiring frequent and regular repayments from all their
customers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this
advantage in view.
Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from the
possibility of issuing more paper money than what the circulation
of the country could easily absorb and employ. When they observed
that within moderate periods of time the repayments of a particular
customer were upon most occasions fully equal to the advances
which they had made to him, they might be assured that the
paper money which they had advanced to him had not at any time
exceeded the quantity of gold and silver which he would otherwise
have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional demands;
and that, consequently, the paper money, which they had circulated
by his means, had not at any time exceeded the quantity of
gold and silver which would have circulated in the country
had there been no paper money. The frequency, regularity, and
amount of his repayments would sufficiently demonstrate that
the amount of their advances had at no time exceeded that part
of his capital which he would otherwise have been obliged to
keep by him unemployed and in ready money for answering occasional
demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his
capital in constant employment. It is this part of his capital
only which, within moderate periods of time, is continually
returning to every dealer in the shape of money, whether paper
or coin, and continually going from him in the same shape.
If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this part
of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could
not, within moderate periods of time, have equalled the ordinary
amount of its advances. The stream which, by means of his dealings,
was continually running into the coffers of the bank, could
not have been equal to the stream which, by means of the same
dealings, was continually running out. The advances of the
bank paper, by exceeding the quantity of gold and silver which,
had there been no such advances, he would have been obliged
to keep by him for answering occasional demands, might soon
come to exceed the whole quantity of gold and silver which
(the commerce being supposed the same) would have circulated
in the country had there been no paper money; and consequently
to exceed the quantity which the circulation of the country
could easily absorb and employ; and the excess of this paper
money would immediately have returned upon the bank in order
to be exchanged for gold and silver. This second advantage,
though equally real, was not perhaps so well understood by
all the different banking companies of Scotland as the first.
When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and
partly by that of cash accounts, the creditable traders of
any country can be dispensed from the necessity of keeping
any part of their stock by them unemployed and in ready money
for answering occasional demands, they can reasonably expect
no farther assistance from banks and bankers, who, when they
have gone thus far, cannot, consistently with their own interest
and safety, go farther. A bank cannot, consistently with its
own interest, advance to a trader the whole or even the greater
part of the circulating capital with which he trades; because,
though that capital is continually returning to him in the
shape of money, and going from him in the same shape, yet the
whole of the returns is too distant from the whole of the outgoings,
and the sum of his repayments could not equal the sum of its
advances within such moderate periods of time as suit the conveniency
of a bank. Still less, could a bank afford to advance him any
considerable part of his fixed capital; of the capital which
the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in erecting
his forge and smelting-house, his workhouses and warehouses,
the dwelling-houses of his workmen, etc.; of the capital which
the undertaker of a mine employs in sinking his shafts, in
erecting engines for drawing out the water, in making roads
and waggon-ways, etc.; of the capital which the person who
undertakes to improve land employs in clearing, draining, enclosing,
manuring, and ploughing waste and uncultivated fields, in building
farm-houses, with all their necessary appendages of stables,
granaries, etc. The returns of the fixed capital are in almost
all cases much slower than those of the circulating capital;
and such expenses, even when laid out with the greatest prudence
and judgment, very seldom return to the undertaker till after
a period of many years, a period by far too distant to suit
the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other undertakers may,
no doubt, with great propriety, carry on a very considerable
part of their projects with borrowed money. In justice to their
creditors, however, their own capital ought, in this case,
to be sufficient to ensure, if I may say so, the capital of
those creditors; or to render it extremely improbable that
those creditors should incur any loss, even though the success
of the project should fall very much short of the expectation
of the projectors. Even with this precaution too, the money
which is borrowed, and which it is meant should not be repaid
till after a period of several years, ought not to be borrowed
of a bank, but ought to be borrowed upon bond or mortgage of
such private people as propose to live upon the interest of
their money without taking the trouble themselves to employ
the capital, and who are upon that account willing to lend
that capital to such people of good credit as are likely to
keep it for several years. A bank, indeed, which lends its
money without the expense of stamped paper, or of attorneys'
fees for drawing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of
repayment upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland,
would, no doubt, be a very convenient creditor to such traders
and undertakers. But such traders and undertakers would, surely,
be most inconvenient debtors to such a bank.
It is now more than five-and-twenty years since the paper
money issued by the different banking companies of Scotland
was fully equal, or rather was somewhat more than fully equal,
to what the circulation of the country could easily absorb
and employ. Those companies, therefore, had so long ago given
all the assistance to the traders and other undertakers of
Scotland which it is possible for banks and bankers, consistently
with their own interest, to give. They had even done somewhat
more. They had overtraded a little, and had brought upon themselves
that loss, or at least that diminution of profit, which in
this particular business never fails to attend the smallest
degree of overtrading. Those traders and other undertakers,
having got so much assistance from banks and bankers, wished
to get still more. The banks, they seem to have thought, could
extend their credits to whatever sum might be wanted, without
incurring any other expense besides that of a few reams of
paper. They complained of the contracted views and dastardly
spirit of the directors of those banks, which did not, they
said, extend their credits in proportion to the extension of
the trade of the country; meaning, no doubt, by the extension
of that trade the extension of their own projects beyond what
they could carry on, either with their own capital, or with
what they had credit to borrow of private people in the usual
way of bond or mortgage. The banks, they seem to have thought,
were in honour bound to supply the deficiency, and to provide
them with all the capital which they wanted to trade with.
The banks, however, were of a different opinion, and upon their
refusing to extend their credits, some of those traders had
recourse to an expedient which, for a time, served their purpose,
though at a much greater expense, yet as effectually as the
utmost extension of bank credits could have done. This expedient
was no other than the well-known shift of drawing and redrawing;
the shift to which unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse
when they are upon the brink of bankruptcy. The practice of
raising money in this manner had been long known in England,
and during the course of the late war, when the high profits
of trade afforded a great temptation to overtrading, is said
to have carried on to a very great extent. From England it
was brought into Scotland, where, in proportion to the very
limited commerce, and to the very moderate capital of the country,
it was soon carried on to a much greater extent than it ever
had been in England.
The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to
all men of business that it may perhaps be thought unnecessary
to give an account of it. But as this book may come into the
hands of many people who are not men of business, and as the
effects of this practice upon the banking trade are not perhaps
generally understood even by men of business themselves, I
shall endeavour to explain it as distinctly as I can.
The customs of merchants, which were established when the
barbarous laws of Europe did not enforce the performance of
their contracts, and which during the course of the two last
centuries have been adopted into the laws of all European nations,
have given such extraordinary privileges to bills of exchange
that money is more readily advanced upon them than upon any
other species of obligation, especially when they are made
payable within so short a period as two or three months after
their date. If, when the bill becomes due, the acceptor does
not pay it as soon as it is presented, he becomes from that
moment a bankrupt. The bill is protested, and returns upon
the drawer, who, if he does not immediately pay it, becomes
likewise a bankrupt. If, before it came to the person who presents
it to the acceptor for payment, it had passed through the hands
of several other persons, who had successively advanced to
one another the contents of it either in money or goods, and
who to express that each of them had in his turn received those
contents, had all of them in their order endorsed, that is,
written their names upon the back of the bill; each endorser
becomes in his turn liable to the owner of the bill for those
contents, and, if he fails to pay, he becomes too from that
moment a bankrupt. Though the drawer, acceptor, and endorsers
of the bill should, all of them, be persons of doubtful credit;
yet still the shortness of the date gives some security to
the owner of the bill. Though all of them may be very likely
to become bankrupts, it is a chance if they all become so in
so short a time. The house is crazy, says a weary traveller
to himself, and will not stand very long; but it is a chance
if it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to sleep
in it to-night.
The trader A in Edinburgh, we shall suppose, draws a bill
upon B in London, payable two months after date. In reality
B in London owes nothing to A in Edinburgh; but he agrees to
accept of A's bill, upon condition that before the term of
payment he shall redraw upon A in Edinburgh for the same sum,
together with the interest and a commission, another bill,
payable likewise two months after date. B accordingly, before
the expiration of the first two months, redraws this bill upon
A in Edinburgh; who again, before the expiration of the second
two months, draws a second bill upon B in London, payable likewise
two months after date; and before the expiration of the third
two months, B in London redraws upon A in Edinburgh another
bill, payable also two months after date. This practice has
sometimes gone on, not only for several months, but for several
years together, the bill always returning upon A in Edinburgh,
with the accumulated interest and commission of all the former
bills. The interest was five per cent in the year, and the
commission was never less than one half per cent on each draft.
This commission being repeated more than six times in the year,
whatever money A might raise by this expedient must necessarily
have, cost him something more than eight per cent in the year,
and sometimes a great deal more; when either the price of the
commission happened to rise, or when he was obliged to pay
compound interest upon the interest and commission of former
bills. This practice was called raising money by circulation.
In a country where the ordinary profits of stock in the greater
part of mercantile projects are supposed to run between six
and ten per cent, it must have been a very fortunate speculation
of which the returns could not only repay the enormous expense
at which the money was thus borrowed for carrying it on; but
afford, besides, a good surplus profit to the projector. Many
vast and extensive projects, however, were undertaken, and
for several years carried on without any other fund to support
them besides what was raised at this enormous expense. The
projectors, no doubt, had in their golden dreams the most distinct
vision of this great profit. Upon their awaking, however, either
at the end of their projects, or when they were no longer able
to carry them on, they very seldom, I believe, had the good
fortune to find it.
The bills A in Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly
discounted two months before they were due with some bank or
banker in Edinburgh; and the bills which B in London redrew
upon A in Edinburgh, he as regularly discounted either with
the Bank of England, or with some other bankers in London.
Whatever was advanced upon such circulating bills, was, in
Edinburgh, advanced in the paper of the Scotch banks, and in
London, when they were discounted at the Bank of England, in
the paper of that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper
had been advanced were all of them repaid in their turn as
soon as they became due; yet the value which had been really
advanced upon the first bill, was never really returned to
the banks which advanced it; because, before each bill became
due, another bill was always drawn to somewhat a greater amount
than the bill which was soon to be paid; and the discounting
of this other bill was essentially necessary towards the payment
of that which was soon to be due. This payment, therefore,
was altogether fictitious. The stream, which, by means of those
circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run out
from the coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any stream
which really run into them.
The paper which was issued upon those circulating bills of
exchange, amounted, upon many occasions, to the whole fund
destined for carrying on some vast and extensive project of
agriculture, commerce, or manufactures; and not merely to that
part of it which, had there been no paper money, the projector
would have been obliged to keep by him, unemployed and in ready
money for answering occasional demands. The greater part of
this paper was, consequently, over and above the value of the
gold and silver which would have circulated in the country,
had there been no paper money. It was over and above, therefore,
what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and
employ, and upon that account, immediately returned upon the
banks in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, which they
were to find as they could. It was a capital which those projectors
had very artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only
without their knowledge or deliberate consent, but for some
time, perhaps, without their having the most distant suspicion
that they had really advanced it.
When two people, who are continually drawing and redrawing
upon one another, discount their bills always with the same
banker, he must immediately discover what they are about, and
see clearly that they are trading, not with any capital of
their own, but with the capital which he advances to them.
But this discovery is not altogether so easy when they discount
their bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with another,
and when the same two persons do not constantly draw and redraw
upon one another, but occasionally run the round of a great
circle of projectors, who find it for their interest to assist
one another in this method of raising money, and to render
it, upon that account, as difficult as possible to distinguish
between a real and fictitious bill of exchange; between a bill
drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for
which there was properly no real creditor but the bank which
discounted it, nor any real debtor but the projector who made
use of the money. When a banker had even made this discovery,
he might sometimes make it too late, and might find that he
had already discounted the bills of those projectors to so
great an extent that, by refusing to discount any more, he
would necessarily make them all bankrupts, and thus, by ruining
them, might perhaps ruin himself. For his own interest and
safety, therefore, he might find it necessary, in this very
perilous situation, to go on for some time, endeavouring, however,
to withdraw gradually, and upon that account making every day
greater and greater difficulties about discounting, in order
to force those projectors by degrees to have recourse, either
to other bankers, or to other methods of raising money; so
that he himself might, as soon as possible, get out of the
circle. The difficulties, accordingly, which the Bank of England,
which the principal bankers in London, and which even the more
prudent Scotch banks began, after a certain time, and when
all of them had already gone too far, to make about discounting,
not only alarmed, but enraged in the highest degree those projectors.
Their own distress, of which this prudent and necessary reserve
of the banks was, no doubt, the immediate occasion, they called
the distress of the country; and this distress of the country,
they said, was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillanimity,
and bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a sufficiently
liberal aid to the spirited undertakings of those who exerted
themselves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country.
It was the duty of the banks, they seemed to think, to lend
for as long a time, and to as great an extent as they might
wish to borrow. The banks, however, by refusing in this manner
to give more credit to those to whom they had already given
a great deal too much, took the only method by which it was
now possible to save either their own credit or the public
credit of the country.
In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was
established in Scotland for the express purpose of relieving
the distress of the country. The design was generous; but the
execution was imprudent, and the nature and causes of the distress
which it meant to relieve were not, perhaps, well understood.
This bank was more liberal than any other had ever been, both
in granting cash accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange.
With regard to the latter, it seems to have made scarce any
distinction between real and circulating bills, but to have
discounted all equally. It was the avowed principle of this
bank to advance, upon any reasonable security, the whole capital
which was to be employed in those improvements of which the
returns are the most slow and distant, such as the improvements
of land. To promote such improvements was even said to be the
chief of the public-spirited purposes for which it was instituted.
By its liberality in granting cash accounts, and in discounting
bills of exchange, it, no doubt, issued great quantities of
its bank notes. But those bank notes being, the greater part
of them, over and above what the circulation of the country
could easily absorb and employ, returned upon it, in order
to be exchanged for gold and silver as fast as they were issued.
Its coffers were never well filled. The capital which had been
subscribed to this bank at two different subscriptions, amounted
to one hundred and sixty thousand pounds, of which eighty per
cent only was paid up. This sum ought to have been paid in
at several different instalments. A great part of the proprietors,
when they paid in their first instalment, opened a cash account
with the bank; and the directors, thinking themselves obliged
to treat their own proprietors with the same liberality with
which they treated all other men, allowed many of them to borrow
upon this cash account what they paid in upon all their subsequent
instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer
what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had
the coffers of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive
circulation must have emptied them faster than they could have
been replenished by any other expedient but the ruinous one
of drawing upon London, and when the bill became due, paying
it, together with interest and commission, by another draft
upon the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very
ill, it is said to have been driven to this resource within
a very few months after it began to do business. The estates
of the proprietors of this bank were worth several millions,
and by their subscription to the original bond or contract
of the bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements.
By means of the great credit which so great a pledge necessarily
gave it, it was, notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled
to carry on business for more than two years. When it was obliged
to stop, it had in the circulation about two hundred thousand
pounds in bank notes. In order to support the circulation of
those notes which were continually returning upon it as fast
they were issued, it had been constantly in the practice of
drawing bills of exchange upon London, of which the number
and value were continually increasing, and, when it stopped,
amounted to upwards of six hundred thousand pounds. This bank,
therefore, had, in little more than the course of two years,
advanced to different people upwards of eight hundred thousand
pounds at five per cent. Upon the two hundred thousand pounds
which it circulated in bank notes, this five per cent might,
perhaps, be considered as clear gain, without any other deduction
besides the expense of management. But upon upwards of six
hundred thousand pounds, for which it was continually drawing
bills of exchange upon London, it was paying, in the way of
interest and commission, upwards of eight per cent, and was
consequently losing more than three per cent upon more than
three-fourths of all its dealings.
The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects
quite opposite to those which were intended by the particular
persons who planned and directed it. They seem to have intended
to support the spirited undertakings, for as such they considered
them, which were at that time carrying on in different parts
of the country; and at the same time, by drawing the whole
banking business to themselves, to supplant all the other Scotch
banks, particularly those established in Edinburgh, whose backwardness
in discounting bills of exchange had given some offence. This
bank, no doubt, gave some temporary relief to those projectors,
and enabled them to carry on their projects for about two years
longer than they could otherwise have done. But it thereby
only enabled them to get so much deeper into debt, so that,
when ruin came, it fell so much the heavier both upon them
and upon their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore,
instead of relieving, in reality aggravated in the long-run
the distress which those projectors had brought both upon themselves
and upon their country. It would have been much better for
themselves, their creditors, and their country, had the greater
part of them been obliged to stop two years sooner than they
actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank
afforded to those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief
to the other Scotch banks. All the dealers in circulating bills
of exchange, which those other banks had become so backward
in discounting, had recourse to this new bank, where they were
received with open arms. Those other banks, therefore, were
enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which
they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves without
incurring a considerable loss, and perhaps too even some degree
of discredit.
In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased
the real distress of the country which it meant to relieve;
and effectually relieved from a very great distress those rivals
whom it meant to supplant.
At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion
of some people that how fast soever its coffers might be emptied,
it might easily replenish them by raising money upon the securities
of those to whom it had advanced its paper. Experience, I believe,
soon convinced them that this method of raising money was by
much too slow to answer their purpose; and that coffers which
originally were so ill filled, and which emptied themselves
so very fast, could be replenished by no other expedient but
the ruinous one of drawing bills upon London, and when they
became due, paying them by other drafts upon the same place
with accumulated interest and commission. But though they had
been able by this method to raise money as fast as they wanted
it, yet, instead of making a profit, they must have suffered
a loss by every such operation; so that in the long-run they
must have ruined themselves as a mercantile company, though,
perhaps, not so soon as by the more expensive practice of drawing
and redrawing. They could still have made nothing by the interest
of the paper, which, being over and above what the circulation
of the country could absorb and employ, returned upon them,
in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they
issued it; and for the payment of which they were themselves
continually obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole
expense of this borrowing, of employing agents to look out
for people who had money to lend, of negotiating with those
people, and of drawing the proper bond or assignment, must
have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss upon
the balance of their accounts. The project of replenishing
their coffers in this manner may be compared to that of a man
who had a water-pond from which a stream was continually running
out, and into which no stream was continually running, but
who proposed to keep it always equally full by employing a
number of people to go continually with buckets to a well at
some miles distance in order to bring water to replenish it.
But though this operation had proved not only practicable
but profitable to the bank as a mercantile company, yet the
country could have derived no benefit from it; but, on the
contrary, must have suffered a very considerable loss by it.
This operation could not augment in the smallest degree the
quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this
bank into a sort of general loan office for the whole country.
Those who wanted to borrow must have applied to this bank instead
of applying to the private persons who had lent it their money.
But a bank which lends money perhaps to five hundred different
people, the greater part of whom its directors can know very
little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice
of its debtors than a private person who lends out his money
among a few people whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal
conduct he thinks he has good reason to confide. The debtors
of such a bank as that whose conduct I have been giving some
account of were likely, the greater part of them, to be chimerical
projectors, the drawers and re-drawers of circulating bills
of exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertakings,
which, with all the assistance that could be given them, they
would probably never be able to complete, and which, if they
should be completed, would never repay the expense which they
had really cost, would never afford a fund capable of maintaining
a quantity of labour equal to that which had been employed
about them. The sober and frugal debtors of private persons,
on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money borrowed
in sober undertakings which were proportioned to their capitals,
and which, though they might have less of the grand and the
marvellous, would have more of the solid and the profitable,
which would repay with a large profit whatever had been laid
out upon them, and which would thus afford a fund capable of
maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than that which
had been employed about them. The success of this operation,
therefore, without increasing in the smallest degree the capital
of the country, would only have transferred a great part of
it from prudent and profitable to imprudent and unprofitable
undertakings.
That the industry of Scotland languished for want of money
to employ it was the opinion of the famous Mr. Law. By establishing
a bank of a particular kind, which he seems to have imagined
might issue paper to the amount of the whole value of all the
lands in the country, he proposed to remedy this want of money.
The Parliament of Scotland, when he first proposed his project,
did not think proper to adopt it. It was afterwards adopted,
with some variations, by the Duke of Orleans, at that time
Regent of France. The idea of the possibility of multiplying
paper to almost any extent was the real foundation of what
is called the Mississippi scheme, the most extravagant project
both of banking and stock-jobbing that, perhaps, the world
ever saw. The different operations of this scheme are explained
so fully, so clearly, and with so much order and distinctness,
by Mr. du Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections
upon Commerce and Finances of Mr. du Tot, that I shall not
give any account of them. The principles upon which it was
founded are explained by Mr. Law himself, in a discourse concerning
money and trade, which he published in Scotland when he first
proposed his project. The splendid but visionary ideas which
are set forth in that and some other works upon the same principles
still continue to make an impression upon many people, and
have, perhaps, in part, contributed to that excess of banking
which has of late been complained of both in Scotland and in
other places.
The Bank of England is the greatest bank of circulation in
Europe. It was incorporated, in pursuance of an act of Parliament,
by a charter under the Great Seal, dated the 27th of July,
1694. It at that time advanced to government the sum of one
million two hundred thousand pounds, for an annuity of one
hundred thousand pounds; or for L96,000 a year interest, at
the rate of eight per cent, and L4000 a year for the expense
of management. The credit of the new government, established
by the Revolution, we may believe, must have been very low,
when it was obliged to borrow at so high an interest.
In 1697 the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital stock
by an engraftment of L1,001,171 10s. Its whole capital stock
therefore, amounted at this time to L2,201,171 10s. This engraftment
is said to have been for the support of public credit. In 1696,
tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and sixty per cent discount,
and bank notes at twenty per cent. During the great recoinage
of the silver, which was going on at this time, the bank had
thought proper to discontinue the payment of its notes, which
necessarily occasioned their discredit.
In pursuance of the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank advanced and
paid into the exchequer the sum of L400,000; making in all
the sum of L1,600,000 which it had advanced upon its original
annuity of L96,000 interest and L4000 for expense of management.
In 1708, therefore, the credit of government was as good as
that of private persons, since it could borrow at six per cent
interest the common legal and market rate of those times. In
pursuance of the same act, the bank cancelled exchequer bills
to the amount of L1,775,027 17s. 10 1/2d. at six per cent interest,
and was at the same time allowed to take in subscriptions for
doubling its capital. In 1708, therefore, the capital of the
bank amounted to L4,402,343; and it had advanced to government
the sum of L3,375,027 17s. 10 1/2d.
By a call of fifteen per cent in 1709, there was paid in and
made stock L656,204 Is. 9d.; and by another of ten per cent
in 1710, L501,448 12s. 11d. In consequence of those two calls,
therefore, the bank capital amounted to L5,559,995 14s. 8d.
In pursuance of the 3rd George I, c. 8, the bank delivered
up two millions of exchequer bills to be cancelled. It had
at this time, therefore, advanced to government 17s. 10d. In
pursuance of the 8th George 1, c. 21, the bank purchased of
the South Sea Company stock to the amount of 14,000,000; and
in 1722, in consequence of the subscriptions which it had taken
in for enabling it to make this purchase, its capital stock
was increased by L3,400,000. At this time, therefore, the bank
had advanced to the public L9,375,027 17s. 10 1/2d.; and its
capital stock amounted only to L8,959,995 14s. 8d. It was upon
this occasion that the sum which the bank had advanced to the
public, and for which it received interest, began first to
exceed its capital stock, or the sum for which it paid a dividend
to the proprietors of bank stock; or, in other words, that
the bank began to have an undivided capital, over and above
its divided one. It has continued to have an undivided capital
of the same kind ever since. In 1746, the bank had, upon different
occasions, advanced to the public L11,686,800 and its divided
capital had been raised by different calls and subscriptions
to L10,780,000. The state of those two sums has continued to
be the same ever since. In pursuance of the 4th of George III,
c. 25, the bank agreed to pay to government for the renewal
of its charter L110,000 without interest or repayment. This
sum, therefore, did not increase either of those two other
sums.
The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations
in the rate of the interest which it has, at different times,
received for the money it had advanced to the public, as well
as according to other circumstances. This rate of interest
has gradually been reduced from eight to three per cent. For
some years past the bank dividend has been at five and a half
per cent.
The stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the
British government. All that it has advanced to the public
must be lost before its creditors can sustain any loss. No
other banking company in England can be established by act
of Parliament, or can consist of more than six members. It
acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of
state. It receives and pays the greater part of the annuities
which are due to the creditors of the public, it circulates
exchequer bills, and it advances to government the annual amount
of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up
till some years thereafter. In those different operations,
its duty to the public may sometimes have obliged it, without
any fault of its directors, to overstock the circulation with
paper money. It likewise discounts merchants' bills, and has,
upon several different occasions, supported the credit of the
principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburg and Holland.
Upon one occasion, in 1763, it is said to have advanced for
this purpose, in one week, about L1,600,000, a great part of
it in bullion. I do not, however, pretend to warrant either
the greatness of the sum, or the shortness of the time. Upon
other occasions, this great company has been reduced to the
necessity of paying in sixpences.
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by
rendering a greater part of that capital active and productive
than would otherwise be so, that the most judicious operations
of banking can increase the industry of the country. That part
of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep by him unemployed,
and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, is so
much dead stock, which, so long as it remains in this situation,
produces nothing either to him or to his country. The judicious
operations of banking enable him to convert this dead stock
into active and productive stock; into materials to work upon,
into tools to work with, and into provisions and subsistence
to work for; into stock which produces something both to himself
and to his country. The gold and silver money which circulates
in any country, and by means of which the produce of its land
and labour is annually circulated and distributed to the proper
consumers, is, in the same manner as the ready money of the
dealer, all dead stock. It is a very valuable part of the capital
of the country, which produces nothing to the country. The
judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper in the
room of a great part of this gold and silver, enables the country
to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and
productive stock; into stock which produces something to the
country. The gold and silver money which circulates in any
country may very properly be compared to a highway, which,
while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and
corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either.
The judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may
be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort of waggon-way through
the air, enable the country to convert, as it were, a great
part of its highways into good pastures and corn-fields, and
thereby to increase very considerably the annual produce of
its land and labour. The commerce and industry of the country,
however, it must be acknowledged, though they may be somewhat
augmented, cannot be altogether so secure when they are thus,
as it were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money
as when they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and
silver. Over and above the accidents to which they are exposed
from the unskillfulness of the conductors of this paper money,
they are liable to several others, from which no prudence or
skill of those conductors can guard them.
An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got possession
of the capital, and consequently of that treasure which supported
the credit of the paper money, would occasion a much greater
confusion in a country where the whole circulation was carried
on by paper, than in one where the greater part of it was carried
on by gold and silver. The usual instrument of commerce having
lost its value, no exchanges could be made but either by barter
or upon credit. All taxes having been usually paid in paper
money, the prince would not have wherewithal either to pay
his troops, or to furnish his magazines; and the state of the
country would be much more irretrievable than if the greater
part of its circulation had consisted in gold and silver. A
prince, anxious to maintain his dominions at all times in the
state in which he can most easily defend them, ought, upon
this account, to guard, not only against that excessive multiplication
of paper money which ruins the very banks which issue it; but
even against that multiplication of it which enables them to
fill the greater part of the circulation of the country with
it.
The circulation of every country may be considered as divided
into two different branches: the circulation of the dealers
with one another, and the circulation between the dealers and
the consumers. Though the same pieces of money, whether paper
or metal, may be employed sometimes in the one circulation
and sometimes in the other, yet as both are constantly going
on at the same time, each requires a certain stock of money
of one kind or another to carry it on. The value of the goods
circulated between the different dealers, never can exceed
the value of those circulated between the dealers and the consumers;
whatever is bought by the dealers, being ultimately destined
to be sold to the consumers. The circulation between the dealers,
as it is carried on by wholesale, requires generally a pretty
large sum for every particular transaction. That between the
dealers and the consumers, on the contrary, as it is generally
carried on by retail, frequently requires but very small ones,
a shilling, or even a halfpenny, being often sufficient. But
small sums circulate much faster than large ones. A shilling
changes masters more frequently than a guinea, and a halfpenny
more frequently than a shilling. Though the annual purchases
of all the consumers, therefore, are at least equal in value
to those of all the dealers, they can generally be transacted
with a much smaller quantity of money; the same pieces, by
a more rapid circulation, serving as the instrument of many
more purchases of the one kind than of the other.
Paper money may be so regulated as either to confine itself
very much to the circulation between the different dealers,
or to extend itself likewise to a great part of that between
the dealers and the consumers. Where no bank notes are circulated
under ten pounds value, as in London, paper money confines
itself very much to the circulation between the dealers. When
a ten pound bank note comes into the hands of a consumer, he
is generally obliged to change it at the first shop where he
has occasion to purchase five shillings' worth of goods, so
that it often returns into the hands of a dealer before the
consumer has spent the fortieth part of the money. Where bank
notes are issued for so small sums as twenty shillings, as
in Scotland, paper money extends itself to a considerable part
of the circulation between dealers and consumers. Before the
Act of Parliament, which put a stop to the circulation of ten
and five shilling notes, it filled a still greater part of
that circulation. In the currencies of North America, paper
was commonly issued for so small a sum as a shilling, and filled
almost the whole of that circulation. In some paper currencies
of Yorkshire, it was issued even for so small a sum as a sixpence.
Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is
allowed and commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled
and encouraged to become bankers. A person whose promissory
note for five pounds, or even for twenty shillings, would be
rejected by everybody, will get it to be received without scruple
when it is issued for so small a sum as a sixpence. But the
frequent bankruptcies to which such beggarly bankers must be
liable may occasion a very considerable inconveniency, and
sometimes even a very great calamity to many poor people who
had received their notes in payment.
It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in
any part of the kingdom for a smaller sum than five pounds.
Paper money would then, probably, confine itself, in every
part of the kingdom, to the circulation between the different
dealers, as much as it does at present in London, where no
bank notes are issued under ten pounds' value; five pounds
being, in most parts of the kingdom, a sum which, though it
will purchase, little more than half the quantity of goods,
is as much considered, and is as seldom spent all at once,
as ten pounds are amidst the profuse expense of London.
Where paper money, it is to be observed, is pretty much confined
to the circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London,
there is always plenty of gold and silver. Where it extends
itself to a considerable part of the circulation between dealers
and consumers, as in Scotland, and still more in North America,
it banishes gold and silver almost entirely from the country;
almost all the ordinary transactions of its interior commerce
being thus carried on by paper. The suppression of ten and
five shilling bank notes somewhat relieved the scarcity of
gold and silver in Scotland; and the suppression of twenty
shilling notes would probably relieve it still more. Those
metals are said to have become more abundant in America since
the suppression of some of their paper currencies. They are
said, likewise, to have been more abundant before the institution
of those currencies.
Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation
between dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might still
be able to give nearly the same assistance to the industry
and commerce of the country as they had done when paper money
filled almost the whole circulation. The ready money which
a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for answering occasional
demands, is destined altogether for the circulation between
himself and other dealers of whom he buys goods. He has no
occasion to keep any by him for the circulation between himself
and the consumers, who are his customers, and who bring ready
money to him, instead of taking any from him. Though no paper
money, therefore, was allowed to be issued but for such sums
as would confine it pretty much to the circulation between
dealers and dealers, yet, partly by discounting real bills
of exchange, and partly by lending upon cash accounts, banks
and bankers might still be able to relieve the greater part
of those dealers from the necessity of keeping any considerable
part of their stock by them, unemployed and in ready money,
for answering occasional demands. They might still be able
to give the utmost assistance which banks and bankers can,
with propriety, give to traders of every kind.
To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving
in payment the promissory notes of a banker, for any sum whether
great or small, when they themselves are willing to receive
them, or to restrain a banker from issuing such notes, when
all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a manifest
violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper business
of law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may,
no doubt, be considered as in some respects a violation of
natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty
of a few individuals, which might endanger the security of
the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the
laws of all governments, of the most free as well as of the
most despotical. The obligation of building party walls, in
order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation
of natural liberty exactly of the same kind with the regulations
of the banking trade which are here proposed.
A paper money consisting in bank notes, issued by people of
undoubted credit, payable upon demand without any condition,
and in fact always readily paid as soon as presented, is, in
every respect, equal in value to gold and silver money; since
gold and silver money can at any time be had for it. Whatever
is either bought or sold for such paper must necessarily be
bought or sold as cheap as it could have been for gold and
silver.
The increase of paper money, it has been said, by augmenting
the quantity, and consequently diminishing the value of the
whole currency, necessarily augments the money price of commodities.
But as the quantity of gold and silver, which is taken from
the currency, is always equal to the quantity of paper which
is added to it, paper money does not necessarily increase the
quantity of the whole currency. From the beginning of the last
century to the present time, provisions never were cheaper
in Scotland than in 1759, though, from the circulation of ten
and five shilling bank notes, there was then more paper money
in the country than at present. The proportion between the
price of provisions in Scotland and that in England is the
same now as before the great multiplication of banking companies
in Scotland. Corn is, upon most occasions, fully as cheap in
England as in France; though there is a great deal of paper
money in England, and scarce any in France. In 1751 and in
1752, when Mr. Hume published his Political Discourses, and
soon after the great multiplication of paper money in Scotland,
there was a very sensible rise in the price of provisions,
owing, probably, to the badness of the seasons, and not to
the multiplication of paper money.
It would be otherwise, indeed, with a paper money consisting
in promissory notes, of which the immediate payment depended,
in any respect, either upon the good will of those who issued
them, or upon a condition which the holder of the notes might
not always have it in his power to fulfil; or of which the
payment was not exigible till after a certain number of years,
and which in the meantime bore no interest. Such a paper money
would, no doubt, fall more or less below the value of gold
and silver, according as the difficulty or uncertainty of obtaining
immediate payment was supposed to be greater or less; or according
to the greater or less distance of time at which payment was
exigible.
Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland
were in the practice of inserting into their bank notes, what
they called an Optional Clause, by which they promised payment
to the bearer, either as soon as the note should be presented,
or, in the option of the directors, six months after such presentment,
together with the legal interest for the said six months. The
directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of
this optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded
gold and silver in exchange for a considerable number of their
notes that they Would take advantage of it, unless such demanders
would content themselves with a part of what they demanded.
The promissory notes of those banking companies constituted
at that time the far greater part of the currency of Scotland,
which this uncertainty of payment necessarily degraded below
the value of gold and silver money. During the continuance
of this abuse (which prevailed chiefly in 1762, 1763, and 1764),
while the exchange between London and Carlisle was at par,
that between London and Dumfries would sometimes be four per
cent against Dumfries, though this town is not thirty miles
distant from Carlisle. But at Carlisle, bills were paid in
gold and silver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch
bank notes, and the uncertainty of getting those bank notes
exchanged for gold and silver coin had thus degraded them four
per cent below the value of that coin. The same Act of Parliament
which suppressed ten and five shilling bank notes suppressed
likewise this optional clause, and thereby restored the exchange
between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what
the course of trade and remittances might happen to make it.
In the paper currencies of Yorkshire, the payment of so small
a sum as a sixpence sometimes depended upon the condition that
the holder of the note should bring the change of a guinea
to the person who issued it; a condition which the holders
of such notes might frequently find it very difficult to fulfil,
and which must have degraded this currency below the value
of gold and silver money. An Act of Parliament accordingly
declared all such clauses unlawful, and suppressed, in the
same manner as in Scotland, all promissory notes, payable to
the bearer, under twenty shillings value.
The paper currencies of North America consisted, not in bank
notes payable to the bearer on demand, but in government paper,
of which the payment was not exigible till several years after
it was issued; and though the colony governments paid no interest
to the holders of this paper, they declared it to be, and in
fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the full value
for which it was issued. But allowing the colony security to
be perfectly good, a hundred pounds payable fifteen years hence,
for example, in a country where interest at six per cent, is
worth little more than forty pounds ready money. To oblige
a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for
a debt of a hundred pounds actually paid down in ready money
was an act of such violent injustice as has scarce, perhaps,
been attempted by the government of any other country which
pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of having
originally been, what the honest and downright Doctor Douglas
assures us it was, a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat
their creditors. The government of Pennsylvania, indeed, pretended,
upon their first emission of paper money, in 1722, to render
their paper of equal value with gold and silver by enacting
penalties against all those who made any difference in the
price of their goods when they sold them for a colony paper,
and when they sold them for gold and silver; a regulation equally
tyrannical, but much less effectual than that which it was
meant to support. A positive law may render a shilling a legal
tender for guinea, because it may direct the courts of justice
to discharge the debtor who has made that tender. But no positive
law can oblige a person who sells goods, and who is at liberty
to sell or not to sell as he pleases, to accept of a shilling
as equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithstanding
any regulation of this kind, it appeared by the course of exchange
with Great Britain, that a hundred pounds sterling was occasionally
considered as equivalent, in some of the colonies, to a hundred
and thirty pounds, and in others to so great a sum as eleven
hundred pounds currency; this difference in the value arising
from the difference in the quantity of paper emitted in the
different colonies, and in the distance and probability of
the term of its final discharge and redemption.
No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the Act of
Parliament, so unjustly complained of in the colonies, which
declared that no paper currency to be emitted there in time
coming should be a legal tender of payment.
Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of
paper money than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency,
accordingly, is said never to have sunk below the value of
the gold and silver which was current in the colony before
the first emission of its paper money. Before that emission,
the colony had raised the denomination of its coin, and had,
by act of assembly, ordered five shillings sterling to pass
in the colony for six and threepence, and afterwards for six
and eightpence. A pound colony currency, therefore, even when
that currency was gold and silver, was more than thirty per
cent below the value of a pound sterling, and when that currency
was turned into paper it was seldom much more than thirty per
cent below that value. The pretence for raising the denomination
of the coin, was to prevent the exportation of gold and silver,
by making equal quantities of those metals pass for greater
sums in the colony than they did in the mother country. It
was found, however, that the price of all goods from the mother
country rose exactly in proportion as they raised the denomination
of their coin, so that their gold and silver were exported
as fast as ever.
The paper of each colony being received in the payment of
the provincial taxes, for the full value for which it had been
issued, it necessarily derived from this use some additional
value over and above what it would have had from the real or
supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and redemption.
This additional value was greater or less, according as the
quantity of paper issued was more or less above what could
be employed in the payment of the taxes of the particular colony
which issued it. It was in all the colonies very much above
what could be employed in this manner.
A prince who should enact that a certain proportion of his
taxes should be paid in a paper money of a certain kind might
thereby give a certain value to this paper money, even though
the term of its final discharge and redemption should depend
altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank which issued
this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always somewhat
below what could easily be employed in this manner, the demand
for it might be such as to make it even bear a premium, or
sell for somewhat more in the market than the quantity of gold
or silver currency for which it was issued. Some people account
in this manner for what is called the Agio of the bank of Amsterdam,
or for the superiority of bank money over current money; though
this bank money, as they pretend, cannot be taken out of the
bank at the will of the owner. The greater part of foreign
bills of exchange must be paid in bank money, that is, by a
transfer in the books of the bank; and the directors of the
bank, they allege, are careful to keep the whole quantity of
bank money always below what this use occasions a demand for.
It is upon this account, they say, that bank money sells for
a premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent above
the same nominal sum of the gold and silver currency of the
country. This account of the bank of Amsterdam, however, it
will appear hereafter, is in a great measure chimerical.
A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and silver
coin does not thereby sink the value of those metals, or occasion
equal quantities of them to exchange for a smaller quantity
of goods of any other kind. The proportion between the value
of gold and silver and that of goods of any other kind depends
in all cases not upon the nature or quantity of any particular
paper money, which may be current in any particular country,
but upon the richness or poverty of the mines, which happen
at any particular time to supply the great market of the commercial
world with those metals. It depends upon the proportion between
the quantity of labour which is necessary in order to bring
a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that which
is necessary in order to bring thither a certain quantity of
any other sort of goods.
If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank
notes, or notes payable to the bearer, for less than a certain
sum, and if they are subjected to the obligation of an immediate
and unconditional payment of such bank notes as soon as presented,
their trade may, with safety to the public, be rendered in
all other respects perfectly free. The late multiplication
of banking companies in both parts of the United Kingdom, an
event by which many people have been much alarmed, instead
of diminishing, increases the security of the public. It obliges
all of them to be more circumspect in their conduct, and, by
not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to their
cash, to guard themselves against those malicious runs which
the rivalship of so many competitors is always ready to bring
upon them. It restrains the circulation of each particular
company within a narrower circle, and reduces their circulating
notes to a smaller number. By dividing the whole circulation
into a greater number of parts, the failure of any one company,
an accident which, in the course of things, must sometimes
happen, becomes of less consequence to the public. This free
competition, too, obliges all bankers to be more liberal in
their dealings with their customers, lest their rivals should
carry them away. In general, if any branch of trade, or any
division of labour, be advantageous to the public, the freer
and more general the competition, it will always be the more
so.
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